Racecar driver Mario Andretti once said about racing, “If you’re in control, you are not going fast enough.” In the 20th century, government saw its role as control, but today’s realities demand faster decisions that keep pace with our economic and strategic competitors.
Nowhere is this more evident than in aerospace.
We are on the verge of personal aircraft that can take off and land in a large backyard and can be flown autonomously. Drones, which a few years ago were non-existent, are now being developed and used for many applications in our national defense and economic life. Airplanes that can fly at hypersonic speeds and deliver passengers to locations thousands of miles away in only a couple of hours are now being designed. Spacecraft are being built and tested that will take average citizens to earth orbit within a decade. New propulsion systems are being created that will allow aircraft to fly faster or, in some cases, fly using only solar power. Autonomous air freighters are being envisioned that will permit vast movement of tons of cargo without the need for pilots.
And this is just the beginning. When engineers and visionaries look to the sky, they see limitless potential for economic growth, new product development, and technological achievement that will define our future.
Unfortunately, all of these technologies must win the approval of federal regulators. And like all such regulation, our systems for managing aerospace rely on layers of bureaucracy and stakeholders — which are inherently slow and unable to keep up with technological progress. We live in an era of exponential change in technology, and government is far behind the curve — perhaps by decades.
On aerospace, in particular, you can’t say we weren’t warned. All the way back in 2002, the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry foresaw most of the breakthroughs that are rapidly becoming available today. Indeed, the predictions of the Commission hold up remarkably well 14 years later.
Unfortunately, one of the predictions that holds up best is the failure of the old air traffic-control system to enable technological progress, rather than block it. As the Commission put it:
“Our current air transportation system is severely limited in its ability to accommodate America’s growing need for mobility. The basic system architecture, operational rules and certification processes developed several decades ago do not allow today’s technologies to be fully utilized and do not allow needed innovations to be rapidly implemented.”
What was true 14 years ago is still true today. And the situation has grown more dire because emerging technologies are complicating the system’s ability to cope.
The main recommendation made by the Commission was for “rapid deployment of a new, highly automated air traffic management system so robust that it will efficiently, safely, and securely accommodate an evolving variety and growing number of aerospace vehicles and civil and military operations.” Within a few months of the commission’s recommendation, the Federal Aviation Administration, working with NASA, established the NextGen project aimed at creating the new air traffic management system.
A decade later, however, the system is still under development. Despite some progress, it is still years away from full implementation. Meanwhile, technology and demand has already advanced beyond the design and structure of the “new” system.
The recent drone rulemaking from the Federal Aviation Administration is a good example of the costs of this failure to modernize. Much of the potential that drones hold — from delivering packages to reducing traffic congestion on our roads — was foreclosed by the need to fit drones into a system that never envisioned remotely piloted aircraft and autonomous aircraft interacting with other air traffic. However, had the automated air traffic network recommended 14 years ago been deployed in time, it would have been much easier to accommodate drones and their potential would not have been needlessly limited.
The opportunity cost of failing to adapt government to the modern world will only increase with time. Imagine the freedom of mobility offered by a personal aircraft that could take off vertically from your driveway, fly hundreds of miles without your touching the controls, and deliver you safely to a destination of your choice. The technology to make this vision a reality is already in advanced development. But the government-run system for managing this new wave of new technology is not yet in place.
The choice is clear: Either transform government or miss out on economic horizons of almost unimaginable proportions. In aerospace, at least, the sky isn’t the limit — bureaucracy is.
Newt Gingrich is the former Speaker of the House. Former Congressman Bob Walker (R-Pa.) is the Executive Chairman of Wexler/Walker.
When asked what made him great, hockey legend Wayne Gretzky replied, “I skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it’s been.” Of course, it is necessary to know where that hard rubber disk is moving. It’s not enough to look ahead, but to look in the right direction, and act.
As contentious as any measure this past session, the California Legislature passed and Governor Brown recently signed Senate Bill 1146, written by State Senator Ricardo Lara (D–Bell Gardens). The original premise of the bill was to equalize the treatment of same-sex married and transgendered students, faculty, and staff in the use of facilities on private, religious California colleges and universities who admitted students using state educational grants. The bill was amended before final passage to require certain disclosures related to the religiously-based policies for these private universities.
In the bill’s previous versions, if a California college offered married campus housing to heterosexual students or staff, they would have to do the same for same-sex married couples. Similarly, if faith-based colleges with on-campus chapels offered them to heterosexual couples for wedding services, they’d have to do the same for same-sex couples — no matter what the religious principles of the institution.
At first glance, the original bill appears to be a logical next step in policy-making as we enter a “Post-Obergefell World” — referencing the Supreme Court decision making same-sex marriage a right.
Clashing with this new right is the foundational constitutional First Amendment right of religious freedom. On a federal level, churches and faith-affiliated institutions have received Title IX exemptions for their hiring and access policies that are demonstrably consistent with their long-standing teachings. For many faith-based organizations, there can hardly be a longer-standing tradition of considering marriage the joining of one woman and one man.
For his part, Senator Lara appeared to discount the legitimacy and sincerity of the Religion clauses. In announcing his motivation behind writing SB 1146, the senator declared, “universities should not be able to use faith as an excuse to discriminate.” The statement raises disturbing questions for people of faith in California.
First, regarding Senator Lara’s assertion, is religion an “excuse to discriminate” or a reason to discriminate? While the world’s great religions invite all prospective adherents, they at some point offer a choice to step into affiliation that is inherently discriminatory in what is asked only of its members. Like that old American Express tagline, “Membership has its privileges,” but particularly for people of faith, it also has its commitments.
This right to “freedom of religion” and related faith-inspired obligations have provided the basis for the world’s most deferential civil society in terms of protection of religious association. From soup kitchens to parish schools, from hospitals to adoption agencies, America has — and protected the rights of — religiously-affiliated groups and institutions.
The second question is the “Gretzky Question”: If millennia-old religious tenets practiced by California faith-based colleges and universities are merely “excuses for discrimination,” then where is this puck going? Will California’s many Catholic hospitals be ordered to provide abortifacients or abortions, or otherwise face closure for discriminating on the basis of sex? Will Catholic or Christian schools be ordered to extol same-sex marriage in their curriculum even if it violates the tenets of their faith?
As two concerned Californians of faith, we propose here a genuinely California solution — one that is in keeping with our state’s progressive culture, our long-standing support of faith-based organizations, specifically, and the freedom to associate, more broadly.
In light of the Obergefell ruling, states from Georgia to Utah have wrestled over the development of their own RFRAs (Religious Freedom and Restoration Acts), but by permitting individuals to discriminate — especially in the private sector — those measures provoked business community lobbying against them, citing legitimate concerns about creating discriminatory business climates.
Rather than a state RFRA, we propose an amendment to the California State Constitution that would guarantee the rights of churches and faith-based organizations to continue practicing their long-held beliefs, so long as the organization meets the Federal Title IX requirements for exemption as a religiously-affiliated organization. Doubtful that our state legislature would take up this measure, we further propose that it be considered in a genuinely California way — through the initiative process.
In effect, we are suggesting an “Inverse Prop 8” — one that seeks to protect all people of faith as they practice their beliefs in the most important way: caring for those in need, doing good works, and providing guidance in meeting life’s challenges through the principles of their faith tradition.
Wherever the puck is going, we believe most Californians can agree that the goal should be creating a new balance among religious liberty, our right to associate freely, and personal freedom. To borrow from our State Motto: We can find it.
Pete Peterson is dean of Pepperdine’s School of Public Policy, and Mario Mainero is a Professor at Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law.
At this point in the election cycle, the discussion about who will be elected as our next president dominates the 24-hour news cycle, water cooler conversations, and our social media feeds. As political campaigns create videos, news clips, advertisements, and other content to inform and influence the outcome of the election, they are coming into contact with an important part of our nation’s copyright law: fair use.
First amendment protections are embodied in fair use, which allows everyone to use existing scientific and cultural material without permission, under certain circumstances. To determine if a particular use is “fair," four factors are applied: 1) the purpose and character of use; 2) the nature of the work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and 4) the effect of the use on the market for the original.
Campaigns at all levels — from the presidential race to state and local races — depend on this important legal doctrine to perform their daily activities, including everything from posting on Facebook to livestreaming a town hall to criticizing opponents. Fair use comes into play when producing TV, digital, print, and radio ads. A campaign might also produce an attack ad to highlight the opponent flip-flopping on tax increases during a TV interview. In that case, the interview is copyrighted, but fair use allows a short clip of the full interview to be used legally.
Another example is livestreaming. Livestreaming a candidate’s speech on Facebook Live, for instance, is permissible under fair use. Without it, the livestream would be an unlicensed use of the written speech, which is a protected work. Even popular “Saturday Night Live” skits spoofing campaign ads rely on fair use protections.
The infographic below helps break down the concept of fair use by illustrating how much political campaigns rely on it. Not only campaigns: When voters post and share videos, excerpts from news stories, SNL clips, as a way to engage in discussions about candidates and the election, they too benefit from fair use protections.
Josh Lamel is a copyright lawyer and Executive Director of the Re:Create Coalition.
“Why can’t the government be run more like a business?” It’s a common refrain. Politicians and pundits often bemoan the government’s lack of efficiency, its rampant waste, and its bureaucratic bloat. Some tout experience in private-sector business management when hawking the credentials of favored candidates for political office — whether Mitt Romney in the past or, more disturbingly, Donald Trump today. It is almost an article of faith, for some, that business-minded folks possess a magic formula to cure the dysfunction of government administration.
The Department of Defense is no exception when it comes to praise of managerial acumen or the need to adopt business practices. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on defense reform, more than one expert declared the need to emulate business practices or loosen the rules regarding private sector executives serving at the department. But there are two interrelated problems with these admonitions to run the Pentagon, in particular, and the U.S. government, in general, like a business. First, and most obviously, the government is not a business. Second, the Department of Defense is already run like a business — and that’s the culprit behind its chronic dysfunction.
Let’s tackle the second problem first. The Pentagon has been managed according to principles from private-sector business since at least the early 1960s. The “McNamara Revolution” at the Pentagon was supposed to bring private-sector managerial techniques to the defense bureaucracy. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had worked at Ford Motor Company, where his application of statistical analysis to automobile production helped rescue the auto giant’s struggling sales. In 1960, McNamara was named president of the company — the first non-Ford to hold the position since its earliest days. But his tenure was short-lived. In 1961, newly elected President John F. Kennedy asked McNamara to serve as secretary of defense in the hopes that he would apply the managerial techniques he used at Ford to the management of the U.S. military.
The centerpiece of McNamara’s managerial revolution remains largely in place at the Department of Defense today. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) installed at the Pentagon in the early 1960s was similar to the planning system McNamara used at Ford to streamline production. In regard to defense planning, PPBS created mission packages around which different programs would be built, comparing them to determine which could fulfill the mission most efficiently.
One of McNamara’s successors, Donald Rumsfeld — in his second stint as secretary of defense, and after spending time as a private sector executive himself — modified the system only slightly. In 2003, PPBS became Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). Rumsfeld believed that greater emphasis needed to be placed on the performance of Pentagon programs. Instead of just comparing system inputs for efficiency, PPBE would use “output measures” to judge how programs perform, with adjustments made following an “execution review.”
But the real problem with PPBS was not that execution had been ignored; it was that defense as a government activity is not comparable to the production of cars. While the latter has a verifiable output against which competing production techniques can be assessed to determine which provides greater efficiency, the former does not. The U.S. military is what political scientist James Q. Wilson called a “procedural” organization. The activities of these organizations do not lend themselves to efficiency measurements because the relationship of resource inputs to organizational outputs is often unclear. This is particularly the case during peacetime when a military’s primary organizational output, success in combat, is unavailable.
Yet, even in the private sector, where outputs can be measured against efficiency, formal planning systems still fail. As management scholar Henry Mintzberg explains, PPBS and similar planning models suffer from what he calls the three fallacies of planning: (1) the “fallacy of predetermination,” which assumes that the future operating environment will comply with previously made plans; (2) the “fallacy of detachment,” which assumes that strategic formulation and implementation can be divorced from one another; and (3) the “fallacy of formalization,” which assumes that procedure can replace judgment when making strategy.
But, as Mintzberg argues, the future environment rarely conforms to forecasts; formulation and implementation of plans are necessarily intertwined; and overemphasis on formal procedure eliminates creativity. These three fallacies were exposed in the turbulent economic environment of the 1970s. In a 2010 essay on defense planning that drew on Mintzberg’s work, political scientist Ionut Popescu explains that while successful firms moved away from formal planning systems and eventually abandoned them altogether, the Pentagon soldiered on under the discredited approach.
The fact that the private sector moved away from the very systems criticized by Mintzberg illustrates the fundamental problem with trying to run the government like a business. Market feedback induced some firms to adjust to the new circumstances. Those who could adjust weathered the storm; those who could not, failed. Such organizational failures are a part of life in the private sector. Over the 12 months ending in June 2016, more than 25,000 businesses filed for bankruptcy — down from more than 59,000 over a similar period ending in June 2010. The Department of Defense is a different animal. It is difficult enough to cancel individual defense programs. It is almost inconceivable that Congress would allow an entire military service to go “out of business” should it fail to perform efficiently.
Even if market feedback were available, government bureaucracies like the Department of Defense could not respond the same way private businesses did. When facing trouble, successful firms reallocate funds, reduce overhead, use past profits to make new investments, and adopt new managerial practices. As Wilson explained, the political constraints under which government bureaucracies operate do not allow that. The Department of Defense can rarely reallocate funds without congressional approval. Political interests actively obstruct attempts to reduce departmental overhead. The military has no profits of its own to reinvest. And even when it wants to adopt new practices, the Pentagon often requires legislative authorization to do so.
As the Senate Armed Services Committee explores reforming the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and as Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter encourages the U.S. military to follow Silicon Valley’s lead and be more innovative, we need to be cognizant of what separates an organization like the Pentagon from private businesses. There are few ways to capture market feedback in defense management, and the ability to respond to it is constrained by the political process.
Leveraging competition between the military services might generate market-like signals for the distribution of resources, and allowing the bureaucracy to allocate resources in response to those signals might lead to more efficient practices. However, expecting a mammoth bureaucracy to mimic private sector practices — absent the mechanisms that make the private sector work — will only lead to further dysfunction.
This is not to say that business practices have no place in defense management, nor is it a call to bar businessmen from the Pentagon (or the government more generally). However, the success or failure of those practices — or of the individuals who implement them — is dependent on understanding the nature of the enterprise in question. Government bureaucracies are not businesses. They face different constraints and generally lack the market feedback needed to know which practices work and which don’t.
It is entirely possible that individuals with business and managerial experience can bring new insights to defense management. It is highly unlikely that they possess any magic formula for overcoming the basic realities of bureaucratic life with which defense management must necessarily contend.
Matthew Fay is defense policy analyst at the Niskanen Center, a Ph.D. student in the political science program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, and a fellow at the school’s Center for Security Policy Studies.
You have probably never heard of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). But they are some of the few remaining bastions of local power left in the United States. Created by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, MPOs exist in all sizable urban areas and give local governments control over how federal transportation funds are spent. They ensure that each town and city gets a say on upcoming projects, ensuring that a super-highway, for instance, isn’t run through your backyard just because the federal government or the state governor says so. MPOs provide checks and balances to more centralized state and federal control.
That is, until now.
A new regulation proposed by the Obama administration’s Department of Transportation seeks to merge any MPOs whose urbanized areas share a boundary into one, large MPO. For a city in central Iowa, with few connected urban areas, this might not be a big deal. But for the northeast corridor, this is huge. The densely packed tri-state area would be fused into an organization that could dictate where and how federal transportation funds are spent. This merger would happen in two steps, in 2018 and 2022 respectively.
The implications are clear. Where do you think New York City will want to spend federal transportation dollars? Probably not Stamford, Connecticut, and most certainly not Hartford, Connecticut or Springfield, Massachusetts, all of whom would be affected by this change in policy. This restructuring would ensure that major metropolitan areas such as New York City and Boston would have the power both to approve and to veto projects in towns in other states. It would form an isolated bureaucracy that will control a massive amount of federal dollars.
Moreover, this will happen not just in the northeast but throughout the nation. Any urbanized area which touches another would be fused into one MPO, creating a domino effect in smaller states or areas where several urban zones are near one another.
Current MPOs in Connecticut
The regulation proposal was released just before the 4th of July weekend and is set to take effect in October. The timing is suspicious. Many MPOs don’t meet during the summer months and Congress is out of session then. Meanwhile, the regulation proposal allowed only a 60-day comment period, rather than the usual 180 days. The comment period ended on August 26th, before Congress came back into session. “We have this thing being done fast and at a strange time of year,” according to Francis Pickering, Executive Director of the Western Connecticut Council of Governments. The U.S. Department of Transportation recently offered a 30-day extension of the comment period thanks to protests from MPOs across the country.
At the end of May 2016, MPOs across the nation finished a two-year collaborative rule-making process that developed new regulations for MPOs. “One month later, the proposed rule comes out of the blue,” Pickering said. “It’s not consistent with, and is not covered by, the rule-making that just ended in May.”
Accordingly, the state of Florida, which has 26 MPOs, issued a strong rebuke to the proposed regulation, citing President Bill Clinton’s 1999 Executive Order 13132 regarding federalism. According to section six of the order regarding consultation, “Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.”
Potential outcome of 2020 changes
According to a statement issued by the Florida Department of Transportation: “Simply put, FDOT does not believe that the Consultation requirements of Executive Order 13132 have been met.” They go on to state that “the foundation for rule making (and for any other federal-state-local policy or program) must be an understanding and application of federalism principles to ensure that our intergovernmental relationship is as effective and efficient as possible.”
Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx served as mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina and chair of the local MPO. Foxx was frustrated with the process of planning transportation projects and has “made no secret of his desire to see MPO consolidation,” according to Alexander Bond, director of the Center for Transportation Leadership. Although he pushed for the merging of the MPOs in the Charlotte region, his efforts as mayor did not pan out. But while Secretary Foxx failed in Charlotte, he may succeed nationally through these new regulations.
Connecticut is the only state to have successfully and voluntarily merged MPOs — a process that took four years and $1.7 million, according to Sam Gold, executive director of the River Council of Governments in Connecticut, who was directly involved with the merger. “It was a very expensive project,” Gold said. One can only imagine what the costs would be in trying to merge every MPO from Massachusetts to Washington, D.C. No one from the Department of Transportation even reached out to the Connecticut MPOs to discuss what these mergers might entail.
One does not need much imagination to picture what this new plan will look like. First and foremost, it will weaken one of the last vestiges of local power and control over how federal dollars are spent. Decisions regarding building roads or bridges in Connecticut or fixing rail-lines in New Jersey would all have to be approved by a central commission in New York City.
Secondly, since transportation encompasses a myriad of different issues — including pollution, land use, housing, and energy — it stands to reason that this big metropolitan conglomerate will be able to impose restrictions and regulations that force local towns and cities to conform to the MPO’s wishes or else risk losing transportation funding. The new Mega-MPO will hold both the carrot and the stick, having both the power of the purse over state and local planning and the power of regulation over what cities and towns can do with their federal funds.
“The politics that we deal with here are not necessarily Republican versus Democrat, its local versus state, local versus Feds. It’s really about levels of government and separation of powers as opposed to parties,” Gold said.
That kind of politics has become all too rare.
Marc E. Fitch is an author and reporter with the Yankee Institute for Public Policy in Connecticut.
Perhaps the most important currency in the Internet age is our personal information. We constantly provide information about ourselves to content providers in exchange for the services we use. We use social media, e-mail, and web-search tools for free because we allow companies such as Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, and Twitter to use our personal information.
But bureaucrats at the Federal Communications Commission are currently considering a proposal that would heavily regulate our ability to trade information on the Internet. What’s more, the regulations would only apply some companies, putting them on unequal footing with their rivals and creating an inefficient and unfair marketplace.
The FCC’s reclassification of Internet service providers (ISPs) as telecommunications services in 2015 has opened the door for a very broad swathe of unilateral regulatory moves by the FCC, including their new information proposal. Under this proposed framework, there would be a heavy regulatory burden for ISPs — such as Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon — that would not apply to other companies that similarly trade personal information for communications services.
There are legitimate concerns at the heart of this matter. Americans are very worried about their privacy online, especially how much control they have over their own information. But a few key facts cloud the FCC’s proposal.
First, Americans’ concerns about their personal information are not, in fact, growing. We live in an unprecedented age of information sharing: Americans are giving out more and more of their information online, on social websites, shopping websites, and search engines, while giving those companies the ability to tailor their web experiences and advertising based on that information. But — perhaps surprisingly — since the turn of the century, Americans’ concerns about their online privacy have not actually increased. While privacy remains an important American value, the level of concern among the public is roughly the same as in the year 2000, despite an overwhelming increase in the flow of information.
Second, people don’t trust the government with their information, either. In fact, the Pew Research Center has found that people don’t trust the government any more than they trust their cell phone companies or third-party websites with information security. (Nor is it clear that Americans trust ISPs any less than giant communications corporations such as Facebook or Google.)
Third, while the FCC claims that the regulations are intended to bring a universal standard to privacy and information security online, that’s impossible by definition. Why? Precisely because the FCC doesn’t have authority to regulate companies that aren’t classified as ISPs (such as Facebook or Google). In reality, the FCC is simply trying to exert regulatory control over the only companies it has power over: common carrier telecommunications companies.
This selective regulatory approach will result in a two-tiered regulatory regime in which consumers are left in the dark about who is allowed to do what. And it will the disproportionately empower content corporations, such as Facebook and Google.
To create genuinely universal standards, Congress would have to pass new laws. And that’s how it should be: Accountable politicians with the power to create law — rather than the unelected bureaucrats at the FCC — should be the ones proposing any necessary regulations.
There’s good reason for Americans not to trust the FCC with the kind of power they’re trying to exert. The FCC has been anything but transparent during this process: There have been thousands of comments made to the FCC during the comment period that have not been made public, counter to the FCC’s standard procedure. Given that track record on transparency, it makes sense to be skeptical about the FCC’s claims that its privacy standards will benefit consumers.
Americans are rightly concerned about their privacy online. But why should they put their faith in the government to keep their information secure?
Kevin Glass is the Director of Policy and Outreach for the Franklin Center for Government and Public Integrity, a nonprofit that publishes public-interest journalism at Watchdog.org.
The folks at the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) are a lot like other regulators: When they see that a given power exists, they covet it.
Charged with developing standards for self-driving cars, NHTSA this week published a set of nonbinding guidelines for the embryonic industry that, to be fair, are mostly commendable as an exercise in regulatory restraint. But buried in the 116-page proposal are ideas that, if enacted, would require a massive expansion in the role the federal government plays in the development of new automotive technologies.
Luckily, for this authority to be realized, Congress would need to grant its approval. If we’re fortunate, Congress will do no such thing.
Tagged with the seemingly inoffensive moniker of “pre-market approval,” the NHTSA pitch would grant the agency a regulatory veto over almost any new self-driving technology. The impact would be enormous, subjecting innovators to unprecedented and unnecessary scrutiny, in addition to a drawn-out process of regulatory delays.
The guidelines contemplate two different paths to grant the agency pre-market approval authority. Under the first, NHTSA could prohibit a manufacturer from introducing any highly automated vehicle without first obtaining federal approval. Under this system, any new technology would be presumed forbidden unless or until granted express permission. Moreover, the guidelines note that this system would require a “large increase in agency resources.”
The second path is at least somewhat more reasonable. It proposes a system of “hybrid certification,” under which the federal government would grant an initial blessing to technologies that would be self-certified later by vehicle manufacturers. While less invasive, this idea still fails to overcome the basic problem of forcing delays in a fast-moving new industry in which virtually all meaningful advancements will be novel. The big danger is that such delays could lead to the rise and deployment of inferior technology, simply by virtue of happenstance.
For those lawmakers who embrace free markets and limited government, opposing both visions of pre-market approval is a no-brainer. Adding red tape to the process by which vehicles are brought to market will only increase consumer costs and chill development of these exciting technologies.
For other lawmakers, including those concerned about the readiness of autonomous-vehicle technology, the proposals might be more difficult to dismiss. NHTSA’s case for pre-market approval authority is modeled on other federal bodies that currently wield similar authority. In particular, the agency cites the Federal Aviation Administration, which uses pre-market approval in its evaluation of autopilot and other aviation systems.
Whether the FAA’s system, itself, is ideal is a separate question and worthy of exploration. What’s more pressing is to make clear that there is no good reason for NHTSA to abandon its current system of self-certification. Under that system, the agency uses a risk-based selection process to test a sample of vehicles and standards. Though imperfect, this approach has been proven to strike an effective balance between consumer protection and market flexibility.
Similar to how insurance companies evaluate risk, the self-certification system balances the potential severity of a hazard with how often it is expected to be a problem. On that basis, NHTSA targets the products of greatest concern. And, by its own admission, NHTSA notes that, historically, “instances of non-compliance, especially non-compliance having substantial safety implications, are rare” under its current approach. Unless NHTSA can demonstrate that highly automated vehicles require a substantially more onerous method of scrutiny, there’s simply no reason to move away from a system that, since passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966, has proven an effective regulatory tool.
Based on a recent op-ed by President Obama published in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, there is every reason to believe that the administration will attempt to make the case for granting NHTSA a more robust role in vetting future technologies. Lawmakers of all persuasions would do well to regard such proposals with extreme skepticism.
Ian Adams is an attorney in California and senior fellow of the R Street Institute.
U.S. Census data for 2015 showed decisive progress in three measures of well-being: Poverty fell; median household incomes rose; and health-care coverage expanded. Using data going back to 1988, last year was only the second time on record — and the first since 1999 — that all three measures improved.
These indicators reflect a tightening job market that’s led to increased wages; policy changes, including minimum wage increases in several states, counties, and cities, that have further boosted workers’ earnings; and health reform’s continued impact on health coverage, as the national uninsured rate fell below 10 percent for the first time on record.
One of the most encouraging takeaways from the 2015 data is that the gains of the recovery from the Great Recession are starting to reach low- and middle-income people. Jobs and real average weekly earnings rose at their fastest pace in more than 15 years, giving a needed boost to workers at the bottom of the income scale.
The Census data highlight the gains workers see as the economy approaches full employment. Incomes grew fastest in the bottom and middle of the income spectrum, rising 7.9 percent in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms for households at the 10th income percentile and 5.2 percent for households at the 50th percentile, compared to 2.9 percent for those at the 90th percentile.
The data also show progress on poverty: The official poverty rate fell from 14.8 percent in 2014 to 13.5 percent in 2015. Of particular note, the poverty rate for female-headed households with children declined by 3.3 percentage points, from 39.8 percent in 2014 to 36.5 percent in 2015, the largest decline since 1966. The safety net continued to play a large role in reducing poverty in 2015. Safety-net programs cut the poverty rate nearly in half last year, lifting 38 million people — including 8 million children — above the poverty line. The Census data show the impact of a broad range of government assistance, such as Social Security, SNAP (formerly food stamps), and tax credits for working families such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. The figures rebut claims that government programs do little to reduce poverty.
Government benefits and taxes cut the poverty rate from 26.3 percent to 14.3 percent in 2015. Safety-net programs cut poverty significantly across all age and racial/ethnic groups the Census data cover. For example, they lifted 23.3 million white non-Hispanics, 6.1 million black non-Hispanics, 6.7 million Hispanics, and 800,000 Asians above the poverty line in 2015.
However, despite the progress displayed by the 2015 data, the poverty rate remained higher in 2015 than in 2007. Some 43 million people were poor last year by the official poverty measure.
To continue this progress and eventually recoup the recession’s losses, policymakers should work to keep wages rising for workers by increasing the minimum wage at both the state and federal levels and implementing the new federal rule that makes more salaried workers eligible for overtime pay.
Policymakers should also seek common ground on measures to reduce poverty. Examples include strengthening the inadequate Earned Income Tax Credit for low-income childless workers, as both President Obama and House Speaker Paul Ryan have proposed; strengthening the Child Tax Credit for children in the poorest families, especially those with young children; and increasing the supply of rental vouchers and enabling more low-income households with vouchers to live in neighborhoods with lower poverty, better schools, and more job opportunities. Strengthening the safety net is a crucial investment in America’s children; a growing body of research indicates that low-income children who receive safety-net assistance tend to do better in school, are healthier, and have greater earning power when they grow up.
As the American Academy of Pediatrics recently explained, “When a family lacks access to steady income, stable housing, adequate nutrition, and social and emotional support, it threatens the future of children and undermines the security of the nation as a whole.” Using the progress in the 2015 Census data as a guide, policymakers should continue to pursue policies that reduce poverty, promote job and wage growth, and extend health coverage.
Arloc Sherman is a Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
“Your money is no good here.” That’s the message regularly communicated to families with verifiable, legal payment seeking rental housing in cities across the country.
Legally, no landlord in the U.S. can turn away a prospective tenant because of race, color, national origin, religion, disability, or children in the household (except in a handful of circumstances, such as the “Mrs. Murphy” exemption). Some states and municipalities even have their own housing ordinances barring discrimination based on a handful of other characteristics such as age or sexual orientation. Why, then, are so many families with rent money in hand being blocked from housing?
The answer is that in almost every city in 42 states, it’s legal for landlords to turn you away if you use housing vouchers.
In a country that proclaims a love of freedom, grit, and determination, the Housing Choice Voucher Program (often referred to as “Section 8”) is something we should be proud of. Housing vouchers mean that folks bringing home peanuts for paychecks can rent decent, safe places to live. Moreover, unlike public housing, a voucher means you choose on the private market the neighborhood and apartment that you determine will make a good home for you and your family. In other words, Housing Choice vouchers allow you to navigate the search for suitable housing with dignity, even if your paycheck is small.
That’s the idea, anyway. In reality, your voucher is your stigma.
Let’s say you’re one of the lucky families whose name gets picked from a voucher waiting list after years of scraping by with no housing assistance. Suddenly, you see a whole new future: You imagine picking out the right place to live. You know it will probably be small, maybe a little cramped as the kids grow, but all the light switches and faucets will work, the refrigerator will stay cold, the stove will turn on, and the doors will have locks. The neighborhood will be safe, with good schools that you wouldn’t be able to afford without the help of the voucher no matter how many extra shifts you pulled at your hourly, minimum-wage job. What’s more, you’ll have a regular place for your kids to sleep, play, do homework, and bring friends over — where you can kick your shoes off and decompress for a few minutes after work, before getting back up to make sure everyone has dinner, baths, and something to wear to school tomorrow. While not perfect, your new place will be a home where you can invite family over for holidays and birthdays, turn up the music on a hot summer evening, and laugh and argue and celebrate and cry and do all the things that families do.
It may be hard — really hard — to make ends meet every month, since the voucher only pays for a portion of the rent and doesn’t help with the utilities. But you’ll know that you’re making a better life for your kids, that they’ll become better educated, and they’ll grow up and use their educations to find good jobs. Maybe they won’t need vouchers to pay the rent once they’re out on their own. Maybe they’ll invite you over for birthdays and holidays to laugh and argue and turn up the music at their homes… A voucher, in short, is your chance to break the generational cycle of poverty; it’s how you’ll do that quintessentially American thing we call picking yourself (and your family) up by the bootstraps.
But when landlords hear you say “voucher,” they imagine something quite different. To them, a voucher means the government is involved and inspections have to been done. In reality, government involvement means that the majority of each monthly rent payment will be guaranteed, and inspections require little more than basics such as hot and cold running water and working lights. But maybe you’ll be too loud, too messy, have too many people over, or damage property. What if the neighbors complain? Vouchers mean you’re poor, right? Surely that comes with all kinds of problems…
As a result, you have no opportunity to prove that you’ll be a good tenant, no chance to settle in and build relationships with the neighbors. Your money is no good here. Voucher holders need not apply.
A recent report by the Housing Research & Advocacy Center notes that voucher holders in Cuyahoga County, Ohio consider finding a neighborhood with a low crime rate to be their top priority when searching for housing. Yet nearly 90 percent will end up clustered into racially-segregated areas with high poverty, high crime, low educational opportunities, and prevalent environmental health hazards.
What do voucher holders identify as their greatest challenge? Landlords refusing to accept vouchers. This is no anomaly. All over the country studies are revealing a widespread refusal to accept vouchers. It’s happening legally in cities like Pittsburgh, and it’s happening illegally in cities like New York City and Seattle.
Improving federal fair housing law to bar discrimination based on source of income — and making clear that this includes vouchers — is a critical step towards equitable housing access for families with small incomes. Municipal and state-level ordinances are important, too. But fair housing laws only work if renters and landlords know about the laws and the laws are enforced. Federal protections mean access to the resources and mechanisms necessary for awareness and enforcement.
This is not a cure-all. Some landlords may still rely on other, less blatant tactics to avoid renting to voucher holders, such as raising rental prices above the level vouchers will cover or requiring large security deposits that families with vouchers will likely not be able to afford. Fair and equitable housing is a complex issue that will continue to require ongoing attention. But a first step is making sure that poor families who are able to pay rent cannot be turned away for being poor.
Kristi Andrasik, LISW-S, is a Ph.D. student at the Cleveland State University Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs and Program Officer at The Cleveland Foundation.
Three numbers: 35,200 people were killed in auto accidents last year; 94 percent of car crashes are due to human error; 613,501 lives have been saved by advances in auto safety over the past 50 years. These numbers form the basis of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration head’s argument for autonomous vehicles and a friendly regulatory environment.
Ironically, though, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is also considering premarket approval and post-sale regulations that would restrict the development and improvement of autonomous vehicles even more than “dumb” vehicles, potentially leading to the unnecessary loss of life.
In a speech on Monday at the Automated Vehicles Symposium in San Francisco, NHTSA Administrator Mark Rosekind said that his agency’s goal is to create “a framework that will speed the development and deployment of technologies with significant lifesaving potential.” However, the very next day, his agency released the long-promised NHTSA guidelines for autonomous vehicles, proposing two new authorities that would do the exact opposite. These new authorities are only options, and the NHTSA is seeking public comment.
The first proposal, the “Considered New Authority” of premarket approval, would require manufacturers to have their models approved before hitting showrooms for sale — a departure from the current process of self-certification. A premarket approval process, the guidelines say, would help the public accept autonomous vehicles. However, this is a long-term solution to a short-term problem; and this new authority not only goes against Rosekind’s own expressed approach but also the way automobiles are made.
“If we wait for perfect, we’ll be waiting for a very, very long time,” Rosekind said of autonomous vehicle technology in general. “How many lives might we be losing while we wait?”
The problem is that approving every single model for every single manufacturer would be a monumental task — and a slow one. Do we really want an FDA-style premarket approval process when delays could cost lives? (Look what’s happened with EpiPens.)
Moreover, models don’t just change every 12 months. Toyota makes thousands of improvements to its manufacturing processes every year, and manufacturers regularly tweak and improve their models. Even the parts, themselves, come from thousands of suppliers, each of which should be free to improve. Given that autonomous vehicles rely on software, manufacturers need the capability to implement change swiftly up to the moment of release.
The NHTSA is also considering establishing an authority to regulate post-sale software updates and is even considering “new measures and tools” such as prerelease simulation. At the moment, companies like Tesla can send software updates through the airwaves — which it did a week ago, making over two hundred enhancements of varying importance. Rosekind saw this as a positive development since it means that safety can be continuously improved.
However, the need for up-to-the-minute updates not only illustrates why a premarket approval process for software would be unsound, but calls into question the wisdom of heavily regulating post-sale software enhancements. If the NHTSA decides to regulate post-sale updates, their regulations should come in the form of self-certifications and post-release assessments. A pre-release approval process for security updates makes no sense.
Rosekind was right when he said, “technology is changing so rapidly that any rule we write today would likely be woefully irrelevant by the time it took effect years later.” Let’s just hope that the actual regulations will reflect this reality.
If not, the NHTSA could undermine its own mission, and the highway death toll will remain at its current high levels.
Grant Broadhurst’s work has appeared in The American Spectator and Watchdog News. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of North Florida and is a Young Voices Advocate. Find him on Twitter: @GWBroadhurst
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission sought comments last June on whether it should switch its default “dose-response model” for ionizing radiation from a linear no threshold model to a hormesis model. This highly technical debate may sound like it has nothing to do with the average American, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) decision on the matter could set the stage for a dramatic shift in the way health and environmental standards are set in the United States, with implications for everyone.
Regulators use dose-response models to explain how human health responds to exposure to environmental stressors like chemicals or radiation. These models are typically used to fill gaps where data is limited or non-existent. For example, analysts might have evidence about health effects in rodents that were exposed to very high doses of a chemical, but if they want to know what happens to humans at much lower exposure levels, there might not be much available information, for both practical and ethical reasons.
The linear no threshold (LNT) model has a tendency to overestimate risk because it assumes there’s no safe dose — or “threshold” — for an environmental stressor. (We discuss the LNT model in our new Mercatus Center research, “Regulating Under Uncertainty: Use of the Linear No Threshold Model in Chemical and Radiation Exposure.”) The response (cancer, in most cases) is assumed to be proportional to the dose at any level, even when exposure is just a single molecule. LNT is popular with regulators in part because of its conservative nature. When setting standards, the logic goes, better to be safe than sorry. That is, it’s better to assume that there is no threshold and be wrong than to assume a safe dose exists when one does not.
But does the use of the LNT model really produce the “conservative” results its proponents claim? There are very good reasons to doubt it.
The first is that there are no absolute choices; there are only tradeoffs. Regulations that address risk induce behavioral responses among the regulated. These responses carry risks of their own. For example, if a chemical is banned by a regulator, companies usually substitute another chemical in place of the banned one. Both the banned chemical and the substitute carry risks, but if risks are exaggerated by an unknown amount, then we remain ignorant of the safer option. And because LNT detects — by design — low-dose health risks in any substance where there is evidence of toxicity at high doses, businesses are led to use newer, not-yet-assessed chemicals.
Economic costs borne from complying with regulations also produce “risk tradeoffs.” Since compliance costs are ultimately passed on to individuals, lost income from regulations means less money to spend addressing risks privately. When their incomes fall, people forgo buying things such as home security systems, gym memberships, healthier food, new smoke detectors, or safer vehicles. And when regulators inflate publicly addressed risks but leave private risks unanalyzed, it becomes impossible to weigh the pros and cons of public versus private risk mitigation.
But the most compelling reason to doubt that LNT is a “conservative” standard is simply that it’s likely to be wrong in so many cases. The assumption that “any exposure” causes harm is contradicted not only by common sense, but by a growing body of research. In the decades since LNT was first adopted by regulatory agencies, more and more evidence supporting a threshold — or even a “hormetic” — model of dose response has been found.
Hormesis occurs when low doses of exposure actually cause beneficial health outcomes, and, coincidentally, the scientific evidence for hormesis appears strongest in the area where the LNT was first adopted before its use spread to other areas: radiation. For example, low-doses of radiation exposure have been shown to have protective effects against kidney damage in diabetic patients, and low doses of X-rays have been associated with an anti-inflammatory response to treat pneumonia. There is now evidence of hormesis in hundreds of experiments, but the LNT rules out — by assumption — the possibility of these kinds of beneficial health responses.
Unfortunately, the way regulators typically respond to these problems is simply by ignoring them. Hence a better moniker for the use of the LNT model might be “Ignorance Is Bliss.” So long as regulators ignore the inconvenient truths posed by the possibilities of hormesis and risk tradeoffs, they can continue going to work every day maintaining the belief they are protecting public health. But the uncertainty in their risk assessments is so great that, in fact, regulators often have no idea whether they’re improving public health or doing just the opposite.
A reconsideration of the LNT is long overdue. At the very least, risk analysts should characterize uncertainty using multiple-dose response models — including a threshold model or a hormetic model — when no model has the overwhelming support of the scientific evidence. And analyzing risk tradeoffs should be a routine part of rulemaking.
The NRC should be commended for acknowledging the doubts about the LNT. When the time comes for the agency’s decision, let’s hope they choose knowledge over ignorance.
James Broughel is a research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Dima Yazji Shamoun is the associate director of research at the Center for Politics and Governance and a lecturer at the economics department at the University of Texas at Austin. They are coauthors of new Mercatus Center research on “Regulating Under Uncertainty: Use of the Linear No Threshold Model in Chemical and Radiation Exposure.”
The classic Daniel Patrick Moynihan quote that “everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts,” is an import maxim in public policy debates. This is doubly so in criminology, where billions of dollars, quality of life in communities, and — most importantly — the very safety of law-abiding citizens rest on policymakers getting it right.
But despite the facts, critics still maintain that Texas’ criminal-justice reforms have failed to reduce crime and recidivism. The reforms at issue began with a spate of legislation passed during the 80th Texas Legislature in 2007, including a sweeping reorganization of the state’s community correction system under HB 1678. Facing prison and jail capacity overruns with no space to house violent offenders, the legislature prioritized probation and parole for low-risk offenders. We’ve illustrated time and again that once these policies were in place, crime rates continued to fall in-tandem with these reforms, despite similar protests from critics of the day that the opposite would happen.
For instance, in a recent Real Clear Policy op-ed, Sean Kennedy argues that despite Texas’ reform efforts, the re-arrest rate for state prisons and state jails (a Texas-specific type of short-term state incarceration facility) has not changed significantly since 2004. Even assuming that re-arrest rates are a good measure of recidivism reduction, the problem with this argument is that the composition of the prison population before and after the reforms is importantly different. Why? The 2007 reforms focused only on nonviolent and low-level offenders. (See graphic.)
Texas’ 2007 criminal-justice reforms shifted many non-violent offenders away from incarceration while increasing resources for proven rehabilitation programs and supervision, such as probation officers, resulting in improved public safety.
It’s almost a cliché that limited prison capacity should be reserved for “those who we’re afraid of, not for those we are mad at,” prioritizing bed space for violent or high-risk offenders. This was not the case in Texas prior to 2007, when only 22 percent of the admissions to state facilities for violent, property, and drug offenses were violent offenders. In 2015, this number grew to 27 percent, meaning that the prison composition on net became far more criminogenic. In fact, contrasting admissions from the two years, the only population that grew in raw terms was violent offenders.
Was this because Texas was suddenly beset with bands of violent super-predators marauding the state after having been given lenient sentences? Clearly not. Texas’ 2007 reforms didn’t address violent crimes. But had we kept the status quo, we would have likely not have had the space to house new offenders. On pace, we would have been 11,464 over operational capacity by 2010. (“Operational” capacity, not design capacity, means milking every last square foot of residential space in a facility.) Texas’ state beds now hold a greater number of violent offenders than they did before the reforms.
The bottom line is that Texas has successfully focused criminal-justice resources on violent offenders while diverting non-violent offenders — whenever appropriate — to alternatives to incarceration. The data show that the non-violent offenders who received probation or who were diverted to rehabilitation programs are now less likely to reoffend than before when they were housed with violent offenders in the general prison population. Texas’ criminal-justice reforms have made Texas safer. They are — and should remain — a model for the rest of the nation.
Derek Cohen is the Deputy Director of Right on Crime. During his Ph.D. coursework, he taught several undergraduate sections of criminal justice research methods and statistics. Randy Petersen is a senior researcher with the Right on Crime initiative and a veteran of 21 years of law enforcement as a sworn officer.
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are no longer a figment of science fiction. They are the future. The technology behind the biggest transportation market disruptor in decades is advancing rapidly, with the “first to market” battle well underway. As the legislative and regulatory challenges in this emerging market are sure to intensify, whichever company can avoid the obstacles and cross the finish line first may reap all of the rewards. We could be on the cusp of the next Model T.
Uber, in partnership with Volvo, is already deploying AVs on the streets of Pittsburgh. General Motors is working with Lyft on a fleet of driverless cars, and Ford has announced their AVs will be on the market by 2021. Foreign automakers are also looking to penetrate the U.S. market: Audi is testing AVs in Washington, D.C., and Toyota is pledging to spend over $22 million to develop driverless vehicles. Given the nature of AVs and the inherent loss of control on behalf of the “driver,” questions of trust, privacy, and safety will dominate the market.
In June 2016, DDC Public Affairs conducted an online survey of 500 registered voters, in partnership with our research partner Axis Research, to better understand the political environment surrounding AVs. Findings show that awareness of AVs is high at 89 percent, while support is much lower with only 24 percent feeling strongly that AVs are a good thing for the future. Soft support creates an opportunity for voters to be swayed in either direction, and, as such, both auto manufacturers and technology companies have some work to do in order to establish a strong base.
The survey also found the average makeup of AV supporters to be high-income men ages 35—54, who are also more likely to speak out on the issue. On the other hand, characteristics of the opposition include women over 55, who are less likely to speak out. This presents a challenge as a cornerstone argument for AVs is their promise to provide increased mobility for groups such as seniors and women — both of which are hesitant to buy into the technology, according to the survey.
When asked what companies voters trusted to bring this technology to the market, domestic automakers had the strongest support, with General Motors and Ford leading the pack. Comparatively, trust in foreign automakers and technology companies such as Google and Apple to develop this revolutionary technology was much lower. And ride-sharing companies Uber and Lyft, which have an increasingly visible stake in the industry, proved to be the least trusted entities, with only 9 and 5 percent of voter trust, respectively. The lack of independent support for ride-sharing companies only adds additional credence to the importance of their partnerships with auto manufactures.
Barring federal preemption, state and municipal laws and regulations will dictate how AVs for consumer use will be introduced and tested for the market. Seven states have enacted legislation or adopted regulations that govern the testing and use of AVs. These policies vary drastically, with some states, such as Michigan and Florida, seen as AV-friendly, while others, e.g., California, deemed much more restrictive. While 59 percent of survey respondents believe state officials should be welcoming of AVs to market, they also see a need for additional regulations and the ability for human passengers to take over control.
AVs have a promising future. Despite the possibility of increased mobility and safety and environmental benefits, the emerging industry faces major challenges. Insurance groups, labor unions and privacy groups are developing arguments against AV safety, highlighting pitfalls in the technology and actual market implementation. Our research shows voters are not yet convinced of the technology’s viability.
The AV industry was rocked when a recent report came out showing that autonomous technology was responsible for a fatal Tesla crash. An incident like that is exactly why average Americans are hesitant to embrace this futuristic technology. Removing the human element from the driving experience is a massive societal change; only time will tell if we are ready to embrace the accompanying challenges. In the meantime, the companies competing for this golden goose would be well advised to address the concerns of the general public and adapt accordingly.
Joshua Baca is senior vice president of DDC Public Affairs, where he leads the company’s technology practice group. Formerly, Baca was National Coalitions Director for Governor Mitt Romney’s 2012 Presidential campaign.
Both the Republican and Democratic candidates for president claim to have plans to make manufacturing great again — but neither candidate goes far enough.
Donald Trump mistakenly says the United States doesn’t make anything anymore and promises to restore (somehow) thousands of high-paying manufacturing jobs to U.S. shores if he’s elected. Hillary Clinton wants to invest in training and technology for advanced manufacturing via grants and tax cuts. These are good ideas, but we can do more.
While issues such as trade agreements and tax policy are certainly important, here are six additional points policymakers should consider in their efforts to create a better future for American workers.
1. Fewer Americans work in manufacturing than before — but the sector is regaining strength. Between 2000 and 2010, the U.S. manufacturing sector lost 5.8 million jobs — over one-third of all jobs in the sector. Since then, we’ve gained back more than 800,000 manufacturing jobs. Over half the value of all the manufactured goods we consume today in the United States is produced right here in our own country.
2. Manufacturing jobs on average pay more than jobs in other sectors of the economy, but a significant percentage of jobs in manufacturing do not pay a living wage. Most manufacturing jobs pay well because the production process is capital intensive — meaning that most manufacturers depend upon highly skilled and motivated employees to develop advanced processes and keep expensive equipment up and running. On the other end of the scale, however, one-third of manufacturing production workers or their families are enrolled in public safety-net programs such as Medicaid or food stamps.
3. Neither these good jobs nor these low-paying jobs are inevitable. Manufacturers compete with each other using very different “production recipes.” Even within narrow industries, the top 25 percent of firms measured by compensation level pay more than twice as much per worker as the bottom 25 percent. The high-wage firms often can remain profitable because they adopt practices that yield high productivity — but only with a skilled and motivated workforce. These practices include increasing automation while having all workers participate in design and problem-solving. For decades, unions helped ensure both a supply of skilled workers and a fair distribution of the value they helped create; the decline of unions is an important factor facilitating the adoption of low-wage strategies by some employers.
4. Contrary to popular belief, gains in productivity can actually increase the number of jobs. It’s true that when productivity rises, fewer workers are required to make a given number of products. However, demand for those products usually rises with productivity. In fact, those manufacturing industries with greater productivity growth have often seen greater employment growth. Robots and other forms of automation are substituting for production workers, but new jobs are created designing and maintaining robots. Overall, manufacturing has a very large multiplier effect: A dollar more of final demand for U.S. manufactured goods generates $1.48 in other services and production — the highest multiplier of any sector.
5. Smart policy in other areas could increase the number of good manufacturing jobs. In the current environment where real interest rates (interest minus inflation) are actually negative, we can invest in areas of need, such as rebuilding our transportation, water, sewer, energy, and Internet infrastructure, with little or no cost of financing. Seriously fighting climate change would create a large number of manufacturing jobs, too, as we move toward “manufacturing” more of our energy from renewable sources such as wind and solar (instead of buying imported oil), and we invent new energy-efficient products, such as cars and appliances, which will have to be manufactured.
6. Good jobs for ordinary workers do not have to be limited to manufacturing. Service jobs can also be organized to benefit greatly from skilled and motivated workers. Retailers like Trader Joe’s and Costco combine investment in their employees with low prices, financial success, and industry-leading customer service. As in manufacturing, these companies benefit from having well-trained, flexible workers who can shift with little supervision to do whatever is needed at the moment. Ultimately, companies create a virtuous cycle, paying higher wages, which increases workers’ loyalty and productivity, which, in turn, increases revenue and offsets higher compensation costs.
In debates such as this, which focus on the future of one sector of the economy, people often tend toward extremes — fearing that manufacturing employment will continue to shrink and eventually reach zero, or, hoping to regain the millions of good jobs we lost and restore the sector to its former level. In reality, neither scenario is likely to occur. But good policymaking could bring us closer to the latter than the former.
Well-designed policies for job creation and innovation can have a positive, long-term impact on all sectors of our economy.
Susan Helper is the Frank Tracy Carlton Professor of Economics at Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University. She served as the Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Commerce from 2013-2015, and as a Senior Economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisors in 2012-2013.
Dr. Ashish Jha did us all a favor recently by pulling back the curtain on the Obama administration’s recent press release touting the supposed success of the Accountable Care Organization (ACO) effort.
The administration claimed that ACOs operating under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), as opposed to the Pioneer ACO or “Next Gen” ACO demonstration programs, reduced Medicare’s costs in 2015 by $429 million. But that figure excludes the payments made by the federal government to those ACOs having savings that exceeded a certain threshold which made them eligible for bonus payments. Include these bonus payments in the calculation, and the MSSP ACO program actually increased Medicare spending by $216 million in 2015 — a rather different bottom line from the one implied by the press release.
Furthermore, as Dr. Jha notes, nearly as many MSSP ACOs lost money in 2015 as saved money. And the ones that saved enough money to be eligible for bonuses were concentrated in markets with high benchmarks, raising the possibility that only ACOs in excessively costly regions are able to reduce costs in any significant way.
The continuing underperformance of the MSSP ACO program is complicating the Obama administration’s preferred narrative of recent health-care history. The administration has gone to great lengths to suggest to the media that cost escalation is slowing down throughout the health sector, that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) “delivery system reforms” are an important reason for this development, and that the ACO initiative is the most important of the ACA’s delivery system reforms.
Unfortunately for the administration, its explanation of the cost story doesn’t stand up to the slightest scrutiny. For starters, to the extent that there’s been a slowdown in cost growth over the past decade, it predates the enactment of the ACA by several years. And the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the much-discussed “delivery system reforms” of the ACA are minor events at best, even if they work as planned. The biggest cuts in spending in the ACA aren’t from these provisions but from blunt, across-the-board cuts in Medicare that almost no one believes can be sustained over the long run.
As for the ACOs, if they’ve produced any savings at all — which is questionable — the total of the previous four years is less than a rounding error in the nation’s massive $3 trillion per year health system.
ACOs were conceived as an alternative to insurance-driven managed care. Prior to the ACA, Medicare beneficiaries already had the option to enroll in private insurance plans through Medicare Advantage (MA), including scores of HMOs with decades of experience in managing care. The authors of the ACA wanted to give beneficiaries another option: provider-driven managed care. ACOs must provide the full spectrum of Medicare-covered services, so that means hospital and physician groups must work together to provide patients with the full spectrum of care. But there’s no requirement for ACOs to accept a capitated payment or operate like an insurance plan.
The fundamental problem with the MSSP ACO effort is the method of beneficiary enrollment. The ACA stipulates that a beneficiary is to be assigned to an ACO if the beneficiary’s primary physician has joined the ACO. Beneficiaries don’t really have a say in the matter and are never really informed in a clear way about their assignment to an ACO. They are under no obligation to get care from the providers within the ACO’s network and can see any physician they want to under the usual rules of traditional fee-for-service Medicare. (The Next Gen ACO demonstration is testing the payment of incentives to beneficiaries for staying within the ACO network for care.)
This assignment of beneficiaries to ACOs has undermined the ability of the MSSP ACOs to operate like genuine managed-care entities. The patients have no incentive for, or interest in, complying with the plan’s effort to control costs, and many times the physicians don’t have any real idea who among their patients is in the ACO.
The recently enacted “doc fix” legislation, called the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, upped the ante on ACO coercion. In future years, physicians will get paid more by Medicare only if they join an alternative payment model, which effectively means that they will have to join an ACO to get any kind of reasonable increase in their fees. And when physicians join an ACO, their patients will automatically come with them.
The administration is hoping eventually to herd all of the nation’s physicians — and thus the vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries — into ACOs by effectively giving them no other choice. But this won’t lead to “delivery system reform” or a more efficient health system. Rather, it will lead to widespread resentment among physicians and beneficiaries alike because neither will have fully consented to participate in the ACO model. The result will be a care delivery system that is indistinguishable in reality from unmanaged and inefficient fee-for-service, albeit with lower payments from the government.
A better approach would be to trust the Medicare beneficiaries to make choices for themselves. ACOs should be converted and rebranded into genuine, provider-driven integrated delivery networks (IDNs), with less regulation by the government but stronger incentives to cut costs to attract enrollment. Beneficiaries would be given the option to enroll in competing IDNs, Medicare Advantage plans, or the traditional fee-for-service program and would pay higher premiums for enrolling in the more expensive options. Competition based on price and quality would push the IDNs and the MA plans to improve their performance each year.
The MSSP ACO program has been in place now for four years, which is long enough to see that it’s not going to deliver what was promised. The problem is fundamental: Managed care plans that are formed based on assignment of beneficiaries, rather than consumer choice, will never have the legitimacy that comes from a patient’s genuine consent to submit to far-reaching changes in the care-delivery process. A very different approach to provider-driven managed care is required for that — one that relies less on government regulation and more on strong competition in the marketplace to deliver higher-value care for patients.