The False Promises of 'Independent' Redistricting Commissions
The current redistricting cycle is about far more than the typical partisan jockeying for control of the House. Ultimately, it presents a critical test for the efficacy of independent redistricting commissions. Advocated by an increasing number of left-leaning activists, lawmakers, and policy centers, some form of redistricting commission is currently used in fourteen states. According to proponents, these commissions are essential to ending partisan gerrymandering and ensuring the creation of fair maps. Contrary to the praises sung by their proponents, however, these commissions are proving to be unrepresentative, equally partisan as legislative redistricting, and incapable of producing a proper system of representation.
The Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (MICRC) is a prime example of these unwanted ramifications. Like other independent commissions, one of the most touted elements of the MICRC was its supposed “independence” from either political party. The commission sought to accomplish this non-partisan status through providing for an equal number of Democrat and Republican members, buttressed by a larger number of independents, and requiring a concurrence of two members from each cohort to approve a district slate.
While this arrangement appears effective in theory, it fails to recognize the reality of partisan ideology. Studies demonstrate more than two-thirds of self-identified “independent” voters favor one of the dominant political parties and have views that are nearly indistinguishable from that party’s registered voters. “True independents,” on the other hand, were often found to be politically apathetic.
As a result, non-partisan commissioners are much more likely to be staunch partisans rather than fair and unbiased arbiters, almost guaranteeing that commissions will favor one side. In the case of New Jersey, the commission’s nonpartisan tiebreaker — a registered Democrat with ties to the state’s Democratic machine — admitted to voting for a Democratic proposal because Republicans dictated the last congressional redistricting process in 2011. Like New Jersey, the MICRC balancing formula is ripe for abuse. Individuals are allowed to simply “self-identify” as independent without any additional screening. Due to this oversight, at least two of the commission’s independents (including the chairman) have a history of supporting and donating to Democratic candidates.
Another element touted by proponents of independent commissions is that they will ensure voters will choose their representatives rather than politicians their districts. Yet in actuality, independent commissions merely replace the accumulated knowledge of a legislative body with that of a dozen or so random citizens. To make up for this deficiency in political knowledge, commissioners become heavily reliant on hired legal and academic experts. These outsiders exhibit an inordinate influence on the commission’s decisions, turning redistricting from an inherently democratic process into an administrative process overlain with a thin veneer of democratic theater.
The disastrous effects of this are evidenced by the MICRC, whose decisions were deeply influenced by two presentations provided to the commission by an electoral consultant. One presentation received by the Commission presented a novel theory of compliance with the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which argued black voter preference would be better secured by eliminating majority-minority districts and diffusing black American voters across additional districts with black American compositions between 37 percent to 46 percent. Following this advice, the MICRC disrupted the electoral integrity of numerous communities throughout the greater Detroit area, resulting in significant backlash from community leaders who filed suit against the maps over accusations it violated the VRA.
One more supposed benefit of independent commissions is that they ensure maps that do not favor any political party. For example, the MICRC is required to balance the districts using “accepted measures of partisan fairness” to prevent a disproportionate advantage to any political party. To inform the commissioners of these measures, the commission’s electoral consultant provided a second and equally influential presentation that recommended three measures of partisan fairness — a “lopsided margins” test, a “mean-median difference” test, and an “efficiency gap” test. Of these three, the commission primarily relied upon the efficiency gap.
The problem is that legally speaking, there is no such thing as “accepted measures” of partisan fairness, and there are several flaws with the measure relied on by the MICRC.
The efficiency gap originates from a working paper published by the University of Chicago Law school in 2014. It was designed as an interpretive tool for courts to measure the number of wasted votes in existing districts using actual historical data rather than hypothetical models. It was not, however, meant to be used as a predictive measure of objective levels of partisan fairness for prospective maps. The efficiency gap measure is highly variable across elections and can’t guarantee that a district slate drawn with an efficiency gap of zero percent at its inception will hold this figure by the next election — let alone a decade in advance.
More fundamentally, the use of partisan fairness measures detracts the redistricting process from its primary concerns. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford (when it rejected the efficiency gap as a useful legal tool) “partisan-asymmetry metrics” are concerned with “the fortunes of political parties” and not with what constitutes proper representation for communities and individuals. The inherent implication in promoting these partisan fairness measures is that the interest of voters are tied to national political parties irrespective of their local communities.
A fact increasingly missed by academics, politicians, and activists alike is that we vote for individuals, not parties, in our elections. Our districts, when properly drawn, are meant to produce representatives reflective of local communities with shared cultural and economic interests — most often best reflected in existing political boundaries such as counties, school districts, and townships. When those communities are purposely split and combined to promote partisan fairness, the result is unequivocally worse representation.
Again, we see this unfortunate result in the legislative districts drawn by the MICRC, which spent considerable time infringing upon the integrity of both communities of interest and existing political boundaries to “unpack” Democratic votes in places like Ann Arbor. Recognizing the damaging effects of this choice, the Princeton Gerrymandering Project gave the state House map an “F” for its Geographic Features, noting its districts were not compact and had significantly more county splits than maps produced by other states. On the other hand, the Congressional and state Senate maps only fared slightly better, with both receiving an “F” for their county splits and a low “C” for their compactness.
The fruits of independent redistricting commissions like the MICRC show the dangers of completely abandoning our traditional method for Congressional and legislative apportionment. Every friend of liberty and popular government should wish to see the pernicious practice of blatant partisan gerrymandering extinguished from our system. In doing so, however, we should avoid exchanging one form of misrepresentation for another. Recognizing the flaws in both systems, a popular (albeit imperfect) system of redistricting is better than a misconceived bureaucratic process.
Samuel Lair is a Ph.D. student at Hillsdale College’s Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. His prior research work included redistricting and electoral reform for groups in Nevada and Michigan.
