Venezuela’s future will not be decided by speeches, sanctions, or symbolic elections alone. It will be decided by whether the country is reintegrated into the global economy in a way that creates durable incentives for stability and democratic governance. The uncomfortable truth is that democracy in Venezuela will not survive on political process alone. It requires commerce and credible security guarantees. Without those, the vacuum will be filled by America’s adversaries.
For two decades, Venezuela has been hollowed out by state control, corruption, and economic isolation. The result is a nation rich in human talent and natural resources but stripped of functional institutions. Millions have fled. Infrastructure has decayed. Private enterprise has been replaced. Any political transition that ignores this economic reality will be short lived. History offers little support for the idea that fragile democracies can endure without a functioning private sector capable of delivering jobs, growth, and opportunity.
The path forward is not simply reopening oil markets. That process is already underway and, while necessary, it is insufficient. Oil alone will not rebuild Venezuela’s middle class, modernize its institutions, or anchor it securely in the Western economic system. What Venezuela needs is a broad-based reentry into global commerce across industries that touch daily life and long-term development. Mining, power generation, logistics, finance, agriculture, and advanced services all matter. These sectors create ecosystems of employment, regulatory discipline, and international integration that oil revenues alone cannot replicate.
A serious U.S. strategy must therefore move beyond transactional energy policy and toward an affirmative commercial doctrine for Venezuela. That doctrine should rest on two pillars. The first is incentives. The second is protection.
On incentives, the United States should actively encourage American companies to enter Venezuela once basic political conditions are met. This does not mean reckless investment or blank checks. It means structured financial backing through tools the United States already uses elsewhere. Political risk insurance, development finance guarantees, export credit support, and blended finance mechanisms can reduce uncertainty and crowd in private capital. These tools are not charity. They are strategic investments designed to anchor American firms in markets that would otherwise be dominated by Beijing or Moscow.
China and Russia understand this logic well. They do not wait for perfect governance. They move early, secure concessions, and lock in influence through infrastructure, mining rights, and financial leverage. Venezuela has already experienced this dynamic. If the United States hesitates again, the next wave of post transition investment will not be Western. It will come with opaque contracts, strategic dependencies, and long-term political costs that undermine any democratic opening.
The unwinding of state-controlled assets will be central to this transition. Venezuela’s economy cannot function if every major enterprise remains an arm of the state. Privatization, restructuring, and public-private partnerships will be unavoidable. The question is who participates. If American and allied companies are absent, the space will be filled by actors whose interests do not align with transparency, labor standards, or democratic accountability. Encouraging U.S. firms to participate in this process is not exploitation. It is a stabilizing force that embeds rule of law and market norms into the rebuilding of the Venezuelan state.
Incentives alone, however, are not enough. Capital follows security. No major company will commit long-term resources without confidence that personnel, infrastructure, and supply chains can be protected. This is where Washington must be clear-eyed and serious. A limited, clearly defined U.S. security presence tied to commercial and humanitarian corridors should not be taboo. It would not be about occupation or regime change. It would be about deterrence, stability, and signaling.
American troops already protect economic interests and trade routes across the world, from Europe to the Indo Pacific. Doing so in a post crisis Venezuela would be no different in principle. Their presence would reassure investors, deter external interference, and reduce the risk that criminal or paramilitary groups sabotage recovery for profit or power. Most importantly, it would signal that the United States is committed not just to Venezuela’s elections, but to its long-term success.
Critics will argue that this approach is too interventionist or too commercial. It is the opposite. It recognizes that politics cannot be separated from economics, and that democracy cannot survive in an economic vacuum. Venezuela needs partners willing to invest, build, hire, and stay.
A Venezuela integrated into Western supply chains, financed by allied capital, and protected during its fragile recovery is far more likely to remain democratic than one left to fend for itself. The choice is not between idealism and realism. It is between shaping the post transition environment or surrendering it to our adversaries. Commerce, backed by credible security, is the most powerful democratic tool Washington has. It is time to use it.
Nicholas Raineri is a former official in the Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He grew up in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
