Expand Cargo Preference to Revitalize the U.S. Maritime Presence
The Trump Administration has called for the revitalization of domestic shipping and shipbuilding capacity. Accomplishing that demands a broad approach and an understanding of the fundamentals of maritime power.
For years, the U.S. has measured maritime heft by the number of ships in the Navy. That count has long exceeded other nations, but no longer. China has closed the gap. Beijing’s Navy is concentrated in the Western Pacific Ocean while the U.S.’s Navy is dispersed globally. The U.S. has the edge in quality, but that gap, too, is shrinking. The trajectory of the U.S. maritime presence will depend on a single word: cargo. If policymakers are not focused on moving cargo, the U.S. will miss the boat. The U.S. must envision and deliver a revitalized commercial fleet.
The Jones Act, which requires cargo transported between U.S. ports to be on vessels built, owned, and crewed by U.S. mariners, is not enough to regenerate the American maritime presence. Stipends provided by the Tanker Security Program and the Maritime Security Program are intended to expand the number of tanker, bulk, and container ships. But the stipends alone are insufficient to ensure these programs’ economic viability. For the Tanker Security Program, operator shortfall estimates range from $100 million to $150 million per annum for a 20-ship fleet.
The key to building the commercial fleet is to expand cargo preference laws, regulations, and policies that require the use of U.S.-flag vessels to move cargo owned, procured, furnished, or financed by the U.S. government. Increased volumes of cargo preference will make America’s commercial fleet viable, expand the fragile pool of civilian mariners, enhance deterrence, and help the U.S. to prevail in conflict.
Nowhere is this more needed than in the Western Pacific. China understands America’s logistical vulnerabilities, particularly how important fuel supplies are in plans that involve Taiwan or the East and South China Seas. Beijing has a military that can take advantage of those shortcomings, and it doesn’t plan to play nice. Regional supply points are sure to be compromised.
America’s allies in the region will need a predictable, reliable, and robust energy flow to keep the lights on beyond the military needs of roughly one million barrels a day of refined products. Now is the time to establish that lifeline as the U.S. did in World War II when the U.S. supplied the U.K. and Russia in their desperate hours. That lifeline originates in the U.S. Gulf Coast.
Coastal refineries have robust domestic and regional crude oil supplies sources and ample fuel-production capacity. These refineries export more than one and a half million barrels of diesel and jet fuel a day. Because the crude stock is local, its availability is reliable and can be surged when needed.
Pair this assured and predictable fuel supply with a preference cargo network that includes ports in Europe and the Middle East, and the result is a reliable, domestically sourced supply chain. This would enhance deterrence by freeing vital supplies from foreign influence, control, and disruption while attracting and developing enough domestic mariners to revitalize America’s maritime future.
Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has sounded the alarm about contested logistics. As he rightly noted: “No joint capability is less developed than contested logistics. For years, the most advanced wargames, with painstakingly crafted U.S. and PRC kill chains, have assumed away logistics.”
A recent exclamation point was added by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dan Caine, who stated with regard to Operation Epic Fury, "Professionals do logistics."
It’s time to establish an enduring and reliable logistics network in the Western Pacific and other regions. That starts with a preference cargo program. A preference cargo program would allow the U.S. to practice, hone and condition every link of the supply chain and keep America ready.
Admiral Gary Roughead (Ret.) is a former Chief of Naval Operations, the senior officer in the U.S. Navy. He is one of only two officers to have commanded both the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
