As the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo approaches its second anniversary, most commentary still treats it as a story about the courts — and for good reason. But Loper Bright has proven more immediately transformative for the executive branch — and it may still force Congress to confront responsibilities it has long avoided.
When regulators decided to make herring fishermen pay the salaries of onboard monitors, the fate of that requirement rested on the 40-year-old Chevron doctrine. Faced with ambiguity over the Department of Commerce’s authority to regulate fisheries, the agency interpreted the law and benefited from judicial deference. Loper Bright ended that deference, holding that judges “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”
It is striking how quickly the executive branch has responded to Loper Bright. In February 2025, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14219, directing agencies to rescind rules “based on anything other than the best reading of the underlying statutory authority or prohibition.” An April 2025 presidential memo made the connection with Loper Bright explicit, identifying the decision as a top precedent behind the White House’s deregulatory agenda.
Agencies have taken that directive seriously. Among the more consequential actions linked to Loper Bright are DOJ’s elimination of disparate-impact liability under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as OPM’s reform of “policy-influencing” career positions within the federal bureaucracy. Particularly notable is the cross-agency push to rescind the regulatory definition of “harm” under the Endangered Species Act, which would reverse a regulation upheld by the Supreme Court in 1995 under Chevron. The administration has also moved to rescind the industry-funded monitoring mandate at issue in Loper Bright.
In practice, agencies are increasingly approaching rulemaking with an eye toward whether their interpretations can survive independent judicial review as the best reading of the law. That shift affects not only litigation risk, but how agencies evaluate proposed regulations before they are issued, with greater emphasis on statutory text and less reliance on judicial deference as a backstop. The administration claimed it finalized 646 deregulatory actions in 2025. But after including guidance documents published in the Federal Register and proposed rulemakings, the total to date appears closer to 1,500.
The stakes of this shift are already visible in major regulatory disputes. Consider the EPA’s decision to rescind its 2009 greenhouse gas endangerment finding. The administration says the rescission will produce substantial economic benefits; critics argue it undermines federal climate policy. Public debate around that decision has centered on Loper Bright. When Rep. Rosa DeLauro recently questioned EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act, Zeldin responded by invoking the Supreme Court’s insistence that agencies adhere to the best reading of the laws they administer.
This dynamic points to a broader institutional question: How will Congress respond to a legal landscape in which agencies no longer receive reflexive deference?
Last year, both the Bipartisan Policy Center and Sen. Eric Schmitt floated post-Chevron proposals aimed at improving legislative drafting and oversight. Yet Congress has done very little to change how it operates in response to Loper Bright, despite the fact it will continue to face greater pressure from courts and agencies alike to legislate with specificity.
Legislators dissatisfied with a president’s regulatory agenda can no longer assume that agencies will be able to sustain broad interpretations of ambiguous statutes. In times of unified government, this may mean less reliance on regulation to fill statutory gaps and more pressure on Congress to resolve those questions itself. And whatever one thinks of the Chevron era, Congress is unlikely to restore that deferential framework anytime soon. The more immediate challenge is whether lawmakers build the capacity to make policy choices directly.
Loper Bright has clarified the judiciary’s role. What remains unresolved is whether Congress will adapt to the same reality. When courts no longer defer, ambiguity no longer protects lawmakers from the consequences of vague drafting. If Congress wants stable federal policy — policy that does not shift with each administration or collapse under judicial review — it will face greater pressure to legislate with clarity.
Ryan P. Mulvey is senior policy counsel at Americans for Prosperity Foundation. In his role at Cause of Action Institute, he was lead counsel in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
